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ABSTRACT 
The following study sets as the starting point of analysis the paradox which one can 
observe in contemporary Georgian public space. Religious discourse refers to Stalin 
as a believer and even talks of his contribution to the revival of Christianity in the Soviet 
Union, despite the vast historical evidence suggesting otherwise. A considerable part 
of the Georgian population expresses respect or sympathy towards this historical 
figure. In this research, it is argued that explanations stemming from memory politics, 
nationalism or from the attempts of turning the image of Stalin into a commodity, fail to 
substantially address the puzzle and shed light on the phenomenon. Hence, the 
following study proposes a chain of signification developed within the discourse theory 
as a theoretical and methodological tool for looking at these developments. The 
discourse on national identity with Orthodox Christianity as a nodal point explains the 
possibility of such an image, religious Stalin, coming into existence. 
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INTRODUCTION  
The so-called Liberty Charter adopted by the Parliament of Georgia in the year 
2011, in addition to other major issues, addresses the controversies 
connected with the Soviet legacy and how to properly deal with it in the 
contemporary Georgian state. To be more precise, it limits the employment in 
state institutions of those people who were affiliated with the Soviet security 
services or held high ranking positions in those units. The Charter also 
prohibits the display of any symbol that represents the totalitarian regime of 
either Nazi Germany or the USSR (Liberty Charter, 2011). But an interesting 
paradox can be observed in relation to this legislation. Despite the legal ban 
on Soviet symbols which might in any way refer to the oppressive system of 
the past, Stalin has somehow become an exception to the rule. One of the 
main avenues in Gori, the town in Georgia where Stalin was born, is still 
officially carrying his name, in spite of the fact that the Liberty Charter clearly 
lists among the main goals of this piece of legislation “the eradication of 
Communist totalitarian and Fascist symbols, cultic buildings, sculptures, 
monuments, bas-reliefs, inscriptions, the names of streets, squares, villages 
and towns…” (ibid). In addition to the ex-Soviet leader’s museum which is still 
operating, his image is widely used for tourist attraction purposes as well. For 
example, one can encounter the picture of Stalin on the wall of a store in Gori, 
on wine bottles, fridge magnets and even on the boxes of matches. The 
empirical part of this paper explores more of such instances as well as the 
political dimension of the usage of Stalin’s image in public discourse, and an 
attempt is made to connect the role of his personality with the broader 
discourse on Georgian national identity.  
 
The main argument put forward in this paper is that an explanation for such 
an extensive presence of the image of Stalin in Georgian public space, despite 
his controversial role in the nation’s history, is to be sought in the populist 
discourse on Georgia’s national identity. Acknowledging the fact that one 
cannot speak of clear, distinctive identities and represent them as 
dichotomous entities, as the subject can have multiple identities at the same 
time, this study, for the purposes of simplifying the complex social world, 
nevertheless consolidates multiple parallel identity discourses in operation in 
Georgia down to two basic ones. They can be labelled as liberal and populist. 
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While the first is inclusive, one which overcomes ethnicity or religion as a 
marker of belongingness to the nation and substitutes those with citizenship, 
the second type is exclusive. It largely draws on ethnicity and religion as the 
markers of national identity, and as a result develops the formula Georgian 
equals Orthodox Christian. Orthodox Christianity, in the case of Georgia, is 
defined in research as the nodal point around which the populist discourse 
starts to organize and it excludes other possible definitions of nationality, 
which itself is a floating signifier. Additionally, as discourse theory argues, a 
discourse strives to achieve hegemony by expanding its chain of significations 
(i.e. chain of equivalence and chain of difference) further into the field of 
discursivity, which is to be understood as all the other possible meanings a 
sign could have in other discourses. In other words, the chain of equivalence 
organized around religion as the nodal point expands into the field and invests 
meaning into the floating signifier – Stalin. In the alternative, liberal discourse 
on national identity, the chain of equivalence is organized around 
Europeaness, and therefore the meaning this discourse is investing in the 
image of Stalin is different. But this alternative, liberal chain is not explored in 
detail within the scope of this particular paper.  
 
Instead, this study is focused on the analysis of the first type of identity 
discourse and argues that the definition of one’s national belongingness 
based on their religious faith, and the subsequent chain of equivalence 
expanded by the adoption of this view, is the key explanatory tool for 
understanding the emergence of the paradox of Christian Stalin, which can be 
observed in Georgian society.  
 
The paper is organized in the following manner: the first part elaborates on 
key theoretical and methodological concepts of discourse theory. It offers 
definitions of the main terms and explains their application. The second part 
of the paper explores the empirical data and tries to link it to the theoretical 
framework. Finally, conclusions are drawn and possibilities for further 
research explored. 
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Discourse Theory and Identity Studies  
 
This research takes as its starting point the paradox which can be described as 
Christian Stalin. This image is largely present in Georgian public discourse and 
represents a puzzle the following paper tries to address. It is not designed as 
historical research, hence, the author does not intend to engage with historical 
narratives to look for a confirmation or a repeal of Stalin’s religiousness. Instead, 
this paper looks at the contemporary discourses, and the references made to 
the Soviet leader when the idea of the nation is invoked, and questions how it 
is possible that such a contradictory image could gain ground.  
There is a substantial body of literature which addresses this phenomenon and 
investigates the role of Stalin in contemporary Georgian society (Bogishvili et al, 
2016; Gugushvili et al, 2015; Martinez, 2017). Some of these works look at this 
issue from the perspective of memory politics and try to incorporate their 
findings into the study of nationalism. While Martinez (2017), for instance, in his 
work also touches upon the case of turning the name of Stalin into a commodity 
for tourist purposes in Gori. This paper argues, however, that such approaches 
fail to substantially address the research puzzle put forward and instead 
suggests that the concept of chains of signification developed by Laclau and 
Mouffe (1985) within the framework of discourse theory (DT) can serve as an 
important theoretical and methodological tool for looking at these developments. 
Starting with the definition of discourse, following Laclau and Mouffe, it is 
understood as the result of articulation which itself is “any practice establishing 
a relation among elements such that their identity is modified as a result of 
articulatory practice” (1985: 105). Elements are signs whose meanings are not 
fixed yet, but once their meanings are defined by their positioning in relation to 
others, they become moments.  
Another important concept which is introduced in DT and is applied in the 
following case study, is nodal points – sometimes also referred to as master 
signifiers. They are privileged signs around which a discourse starts to organize. 
“The nodal point creates and sustains the identity of a certain discourse by 
constructing a knot of definite meanings” (Torfing, 1999: 98). The meaning of 
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other signs is defined in relation to the nodal point. To put the process in simpler 
terms, “a variety of signifiers are floating within the field of discursivity as their 
traditional meaning has been lost; suddenly some master signifier intervenes 
and retroactively constitutes their identity by fixing the floating signifiers within a 
pragmatic chain of equivalence” (ibid: 99). Every discourse then itself becomes 
an expansion of the chain of significations to partially fix the meanings of the 
floating signifiers within the field of discursivity i.e. in all the possible meanings 
the sign could have in other discourses. Here it is important to mention the 
distinction between the discursive and the discourse. Latter, as it was already 
mentioned, is the partially achieved fixation of the meaning of signifiers, 
whereas the “unfixed elements of a disintegrated discourse” fall into the field of 
discursivity (Torfing, 1999: 93). Disruption of the conditions of possibilities upon 
which the partial fixations achieved by a concrete discourse rest, might lead to 
the reincorporation of other meanings, which were previously excluded by that 
particular discourse or in other words, new or additional meanings would be 
drawn and transferred from the field of discursivity into the discourse. This 
process requires the existence of a constitutive other, something in negation of 
which one’s identity is constructed.   
It is important to note that the discourse theory argues that there is no essential 
identity, but only forms of identifications. Even national identities, while they 
appear as something natural, “are always contingent constructions made 
possible through a variety of practices, discourses and language games, and 
they can be transformed and rearticulated in different ways” (Mouffe, 2013: 45). 
The creation of identity in such processes always implies the establishment of 
a difference. To put it differently, the creation of ‘we’ can only exist through the 
formulation of ‘they’ (ibid). The constitution of the collective identity requires the 
creation of the frontier between those who belong to the community and those 
who do not. Hence, this paper follows the understanding of nationalism as the 
DT would define it: a certain articulation of the empty signifier – the nation, which 
functions as the symbol of an unachievable fullness. This means that 
nationalism is a myth – a distorted reality, which at the same time is vital and 
constitutive, as it establishes “a necessary horizon for our acts” (Jorgensen and 
Philips, 2010: 39). The nation or a society as a totality does not really exist, 
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instead it is constantly produced by the discourses and is verbalized as such, 
“but the totality remains an imaginary entity” (ibid). From this perspective, the 
terms that are used to describe society as a total entity are empty signifiers at 
the centre of discourses, invested with different meanings based on the 
articulation. Constitution of the society ends up in the paradox of a vain attempt 
to institute the impossible object – society (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985).  
To recap what has been argued above, this paper is looking at the image of 
Stalin in Georgian public discourses from the discourse theory perspective. 
Stalin is understood as a floating signifier, which is open to different kinds of 
meanings and there is a constant struggle going on between the various 
discourses to fix the meaning of this sign. Christianisation of the Soviet leader 
can be regarded as the result of the chain of signification articulated by the 
populist discourse on national identity, the nodal point of which is Orthodox 
Christianity. It should be noted that such fixation of signs is always temporary 
and hence the society can never be regarded as an objective totality, despite 
the discourses on the national identity constantly referring to it as such. 
 
Methodology of Poststructuralist Research 
Discourse theory shares ontological and epistemological grounds with 
poststructuralism. The latter takes as its starting point the understanding of 
language provided by Saussure’s structural linguistics. To be more exact, it 
agrees with structuralism in perceiving language as a kind of net, where 
meanings of the signs are acquired through differentiation from each other; the 
positioning of the sign in the net gives meaning to it. But in addition, 
poststructuralist scholars would argue that the structure itself is not stable but 
always open for new meanings (Jorgensen and Philips, 2010). In the same 
manner as language, social phenomena are never finished or total. Instead, DT 
suggests that this “opens up the way for constant struggles about definitions of 
society and identity” (ibid: 24). It means that the creation of meanings is a social 
process with constant struggle, negotiations and attempts to fix the signs in the 
structure of language. But as it was already mentioned above, discourse theory 
also argues that no total fixation is possible, hence the analysis should be 
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focused on the processes or attempts of achieving such a structure and on how 
some of the meanings come to be accepted as natural. 
As it was elaborated in the theory part, Laclau and Mouffe (1985: 105) defined 
discourse as “the structure of totality” which is the result of articulatory practices, 
or the process “of establishing a relation among elements such that their identity 
is modified.” The main focus of discourse theory as a research framework 
should be on how certain meanings are developed through the establishment 
of the relationship between the elements, and how certain elements are 
excluded. It is also important to look at what specific discourses the articulation 
process draws on and reproduces; and whether it tries to challenge and change 
an existing discourse or aims to transform it (Jorgensen and Philips, 2010). 
In such context, identifying nodal points is what the analysis should start with. 
Orthodox Christianity is the master signifier in the case of the populist discourse 
and the chain of equivalence which is explored in texts is the following: Orthodox 
Christianity = Georgian = Stalin. Discourse not only constitutes the meaning, but 
at the same time it sets the limits of what can be said or produced. It is important 
to note that Orthodox Christianity is only a nodal point in case of one particular 
discourse, but it becomes a floating signifier or even an empty signifier when we 
are looking at the broader picture of competing discourses trying to invest 
different meanings in it.  
In addition to the emphasis on the importance of the language, discourse theory 
follows poststructuralism in departing from Cartesian understanding of the 
subject and argues that one is not autonomous, but his or her identity is rather 
determined by his or her positioning in discourses. Such positioning is not only 
in one way, but it changes and gets altered from discourse to discourse. These 
multiple positionings might clash with each other when competing discourses 
try to organize around the same social space (Jorgensen and Philips, 2010). As 
a result, social antagonism arises. In the case explored in this paper, one can 
characterize the clash and competition between the inclusive and exclusive 
discourses over the meaning of Stalin as an example of such social antagonism. 
It can be overcome only with what the DT calls hegemonic intervention, but this 
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line of identity (re)production processes is not explored within the framework of 
this study.  
To complement the methodological framework, this paper borrows the 
conceptualization of identity developed by Lene Hansen (2006) in her study of 
the war in the Balkans. Hansen conceptualizes identities as discursive, political, 
relational and social. The first two aspects signify that identities are not 
objective; identity cannot be found somewhere in an extra-discursive realm. The 
relational feature of identity means that it is always given through a reference to 
something else, something it is not. While social features of identity stem from 
it being articulated collectively, individual identity is being constituted within the 
collective. Identity and policy are understood to be linked through discourses, 
but not being in a causal relationship, “as representations of identity are 
simultaneously the precondition for and (re)produced through articulations of 
policy” (Hansen, 2006: 10). In other words, those actors who formulate foreign 
policy or are interested in altering the existing goals, try to present their claims 
as legitimate and natural.  
As Hansen argues, the study of discourses on foreign policy “calls in addition 
for particular attention to the methodology of reading” (Hansen, 2006: 2). As she 
writes, all the texts that are constituting foreign policy debates, are organized 
around common themes, “around certain constructions of identity” and as a 
result, foreign policy debates are bounded together by a small number of 
discourses (Hansen, 2006). She suggests guidelines for identifying and 
selecting this small set of discourses, so-called “basic discourses,” which can 
provide a lens through which one can see the representations and policies as 
systematically connected, or key points around which the disagreements within 
the debates are structured. This research follows those methodological 
guidelines for identifying the basic discourses.  
First of all, basic discourses are based on the reading of a larger number of 
texts. Secondly, according to Hansen, “basic discourses should be built on 
explicit articulation of key representations of identity, for example: “The Balkans” 
and “genocide”” (Hansen, 2006: 53). Within the framework of this particular 
research, what is looked at, for instance, is the articulation of Orthodox 
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Christianity as Georgian and its expression in the public discourse. She also 
argues that basic discourses should be drawn upon “available conceptual 
histories of the representations chosen” (ibid) and should be composed of 
Others and Selves being differently articulated as spatial, temporal or ethical 
constructions of identity. Hansen also claims that due to the fact that basic 
discourses articulate different Selves and Others, it is logical to expect that they 
will argue for different foreign policies. The final point Hansen makes in terms 
of tracing those discourses is that “it is likely that at least one discourse will be 
argued relatively quickly as an issue manifests itself on the foreign policy 
agenda, while the other basic discourse(s) will be argued in response to and in 
criticism of this position” (Hansen, 2006: 53-54). To translate it for the purposes 
of this study, the dominant discourse in Georgia in relation to identity is Orthodox 
Christianity = Georgian, and other discourses organize in response to it. What 
is important to note is that despite this research drawing on Hansen’s works on 
the relationship between foreign policy and identity, it does not engage with the 
former.  
Another concept which is borrowed from Hansen’s methodological framework 
is intertextuality, meaning that “every individual text is always located within a 
shared textual space” (Hansen, 2006: 55). In other words, while the discourse 
analysis of the text is performed, it is important to look at how it is presented in 
“later re-readings” and how these two differ from each other. Such intertextual 
reading within the framework of discourse analysis helps to understand how 
discourses embedded within the official texts and representations are projected 
to the larger public and legitimized. This leads to the concept of interdiscursivity 
which “indicates that discourses are linked to each other in various ways” 
(Wodak, 2008: 3). Such interdiscursive reading, in addition to intertextuality, 
helps to identify how discourses on human rights, education etc. are, for 
example, interlinked with discourses on identity.  
Finally, regarding data selection and sampling, as this research focuses on 
public discourse, it does not intend to uncover the true meanings or intentions 
behind statements or newspaper articles. It simply aims to illustrate the chain of 
equivalence and how it is expanded in the field of discursivity, giving meaning 
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to floating signifiers. Data, which were looked at, are part of a larger research 
project. These texts were selected from two widely-read populist newspapers, 
“Asaval-Dasavali” and “Saqartvelo da Msoflio.” Four issues from each year, 
from 1991 to 2016 in case of the former, and from 2009 (the year it was first 
issued) to the year 2016, in case of the second newspaper, were selected. In 
addition, speeches and statements made by clergymen and politicians were 
analysed. It must be noted that for discourse analysis, texts should not be 
understood in the literal meaning. Instead, a discourse analyst should look at 
symbols, institutions, traditions etc. that represent the texts. But for this 
particular paper, only those texts were selected, which explicitly articulated the 
chain of significations of the populist discourse in relation to Stalin. 
 
Christian Stalin 
The Caucasus Barometer opinion survey results from 2012 illustrated an 
interesting trend. In response to the question what best described their attitude 
towards Stalin, 3% chose admiration, 27% - respect, and 15% - sympathy, 
which altogether makes 45% of the respondents’ feelings rather positive 
towards Stalin. In comparison, in Armenia this number is 25% (3%, 16%, and 
6% respectively) and in the case of Azerbaijan, only 21% feel rather positively 
towards Stalin. In contrast, in response to the question of whether Stalin was a 
cruel tyrant who was responsible for the death of millions, 53% of Georgians 
either completely or mostly agree, in comparison to 24% who disagree 
completely or mostly. The percentage of those who agree with that statement 
in Armenia and Azerbaijan was 69% and 68%, respectively (Caucasus 
Barometer, 2012). These figures are interesting, as in addition to those who do 
not see the Soviet leader either in a negative light or as a brutal dictator, there 
is about 8% of Georgian respondents who mostly agree that Stalin was a tyrant 
who is responsible for the death of millions, but still either respect him or have 
sympathy for him. The reason for such an odd picture is not to be sought in 
those respondents’ admiration of murderers and brutal dictators, but instead it 
has its roots in the Georgian discourses on national identity. Stalin’s ethnic 
background is the source of pride and egotism for what this paper labels 
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exclusive national identity narrative. As a contemporary Georgian philosopher 
nicely put it, Stalin’s heavy Georgian accent when he spoke Russian was a 
source of the national pride Once a Georgian living in the era of Stalin would 
put the radio on and hear the leader speaking Russian with a Caucasian accent, 
he or she would realize that the “father” of all the nations is of the same ethnic 
origin, which “gives such a power to the Georgian self-conscious, that any kind 
of humanitarian discussion of Stalin’s crimes sounds ridiculous” (Maisuradze, 
2011: 73). Stalin being a symbol of national pride is the reason that the 
destalinization processes which started immediately after his death in 1953 
caused unrest and mass protests in Georgia. Events which shook the streets of 
Tbilisi in the spring of 1956 were not so much about defending the name of 
Stalin or his legacy, but rather it was an expression of Georgian nationalism. 
Khrushchev’s famous speech at the 20th Congress of the C.P.S.U. in February 
of 1956 where he denounced the cult of Stalin, was perceived by Georgian 
youth as an attack on their national pride. In the beginning of March of the same 
year, around the anniversary of Stalin’s death and just a couple of days after the 
Congress, tens of thousands of students started protesting in the streets of 
Tbilisi, Gori, Kutaisi and other towns of Georgia. By the 9th of March, Soviet 
authorities were forced to use firearms to disperse the manifestations. The exact 
number of victims of the events, which are known in Georgian history as the 
tragedy of the 9th of March, 1956, is still unknown. Historians estimate it to be 
somewhere between 100 and 800. Ironically, the processes which escalated in 
defence of the person who was responsible for the occupation of the first 
republic of Georgia by the USSR, became the source of the birth of the new 
wave of Georgian nationalism. The offspring of the tragedy of the 9th of March 
was the very first underground organisation which started propagating for the 
independence and national self-determination of Georgia (Abdaladze et al., 
2008: 184-185). 
While looking at national pride as the source of admiration towards Stalin among 
Georgians sheds some light on the phenomenon, it does not fully explain, if it 
does at all, the paradox which was the starting point of this research i.e. the 
image of Christian Stalin. In the year 2013 Ilia II, patriarch of the Georgian 
Orthodox Church (GOC), within the framework of his visit to Russia, where he 
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personally met with his Russian counterpart and President Vladimir Putin, gave 
an interview to the journal Caucasus Politics. In his interview, he praised Stalin, 
calling him a prominent figure who was aware of Russia’s importance to the 
world. He also claimed that he thought Stalin was a believer, especially in his 
later years. In the same interview, the head of the GOC claimed that Stalin, as 
a former student of the seminary himself, did a lot for the development of the 
religious education in the Soviet Union. In addition, the Patriarch stated that he 
was crying after he heard the news of Stalin’s death (Netgazeti, 2013).  
In the summer of 2010, the last standing monument of Stalin in public space 
was removed from the main square of Gori. As it was mentioned in the 
introduction, the hometown of the Soviet leader still cherishes his name and in 
some cases even violates state legislation. To be more precise, it acts in direct 
violation of the Liberty Charter, which sets as its goal the eradication of the street 
names, monuments and symbols in any way representing the totalitarian 
regime. In addition to street names, the museum dedicated to him and other 
traditional ways of honouring the name of Stalin, his image is actively used for 
tourist purposes. In the autumn of 2017, news appeared that a new café is 
supposed to open in Gori soon called “Joseph” and it will be decorated with 
Stalin’s portraits (Information Centre of Inner Kartli, 2017). An interesting detail 
which should be mentioned here is that Stalin in this sense is an empty signifier. 
It is a sign with no meaning in itself, but is actually the subject of competition 
between discourses on national identity trying to define it. This is what Laclau 
and Mouffe (1985) call social antagonism i.e. conflict which arises as the result 
of a subject’s identity being defined at the same time by mutually exclusive 
discourses. The events unfolding in Gori are a good example of such 
phenomenon. In 2017, an attempt was made by the members of Gori city 
council to name the square where Stalin’s monument used to stand, the square 
of Europe, but the attempt failed. The official reason for the rejection was that 
such a decision required further engagement with citizens, while some suspect 
that it actually speaks of the special status of Stalin in Gori. What is interesting 
for this particular study is how Europe is constructed as something opposite of 
Stalin. For example, Radio Liberty titled the news piece covering the 
developments as “Gori Will Not Have the Square of Europe – the Joy of 
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Stalinists” (Aptsiarui, 2017). This is how the liberal or what is labelled here as 
an inclusive national identity discourse, would expand its chain of significations 
in the field of discursivity and try to fix the meaning of Stalin as someone 
uncivilized, a stranger to Europe and hence to Georgian national identity as well, 
as this discourse is centred around the nodal point of Europeaness.  
In contrast, the exclusive discourse on national identity which articulates its 
chain of significations around Orthodox Christianity as the nodal point, invests 
Stalin with a different meaning. Turning back to the summer of 2010, when the 
monument of Stalin was taken down, newspaper “საქათველო და მსოფლიო“ 
(Georgia and the World) published a long opinion piece entitled “The Country of 
Slaves” (Berdzenishvili, 2010). Since the publication touches upon key 
elements of the discourse, some parts should be cited at length. Firstly, the 
author claims that the removal of the statue is the biggest act of vandalism the 
world has ever seen:  
“In addition, every bastard and bitch, call a “bloodsucking tyrant” the person, 
who because he was following the way of Christ, was recognized as a saint by 
the Orthodox Church” (Berdzenishvili, 2010: 13).  
Then opinion piece goes on to argue how Stalin saved Georgia from extinction, 
and how the Soviet Union eradicated unemployment, provided free housing, 
healthcare, education etc. The author also engages in reproducing the image 
of Stalin taking care of Georgian territories by claiming that “the truth is Stalin 
united with Georgia Abkhazian SSR as SS Autonomy in 1931 … if America had 
not exploded an atomic bomb in 1945, Stalin was ready to return back to 
Georgia territories conquered by Turkey” (ibid).  
There are two basic themes in this article which are important to highlight within 
the framework of this study. Firstly, the image of an Orthodox Christian Stalin, 
who was a true believer and was recognized so by the Church. And secondly, 
he is portrayed as a true patriot who cared about Georgia. As a combination of 
those two strands of thought, Orthodox Christianity and the notion of being 
Georgian form a chain of signification which fixes the meaning of Stalin in 
relation to other possible meanings he could have, such as dictator, tyrant, 
enemy of Georgia etc.  
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Finally, Christian Stalin is the offspring of the discourses articulated from 1990s. 
The reason for this is very simple, as only after the breakup of the Soviet Union 
did Orthodox Christianity become the master signifier for the populist discourse 
on national identity. With the disappearance of the communist ideology, the 
traditional meaning of Stalin was lost, and the chain of equivalence with 
Orthodox Christianity as the nodal point expanded in the field of discursivity and 
tried to invest new meaning in Stalin. Hence, it is necessary to further explore 
how the chain of Orthodox Christian equals Georgian is articulated and the idea 
of Christian Stalin is reproduced.  
With the collapse of the Soviet Union, an ideological vacuum occurred, which 
emerging Georgian state institutions were not able to fill. To be more exact, 
since the declaration of independence in 1991, Georgia has gone through 
armed conflicts in South Ossetia and Abkhazia, a so-called Tbilisi civil war which 
ousted the first president, three assassination attempts on the second president 
Shevardnadze, and the rose revolution in 2003, all the while battling with 
corruption and the collapse of basic state institutions. In this period, which is 
known in Georgian popular culture as the dark 90s, the only institution which 
remained intact, and in fact, even managed to get stronger, was the Georgian 
Orthodox Church.  
Due to historical circumstances, Christianity has always played a major role in 
the Georgian national consciousness as a marker of identity. Surrounded by 
Muslim empires and involved in a constant struggle for survival, religious faith 
was a major constitutive factor of what it meant to be a Georgian. Therefore, it 
is not surprising that with the economic and social breakdown which followed 
the collapse of the USSR, the role of religion re-emerged again, and it gained 
new significance. This trend can be observed in surveys by the Caucasus 
Barometer (2015), according to which, from 2008 to 2015, trust in religious 
institutions in Georgia was never lower than 80%, whereas in contrast, trust in 
the parliament for instance, fell from 35% in 2008 down to 16% in 2015, trust in 
the president decreased from 52 to 33% within the same timeframe, while trust 
in political parties in 2015 was as low as 8%. Translating these numbers into 
the national identity discourse, research on collective memory and identity 
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among Georgians (Gugishvili et al, 2015) has revealed that while it is very 
important to speak fluent Georgian or to be born in Georgia to be considered 
Georgian, the most important thing, according to the participants’ responses, is 
to be Christian. About 44.2% think of religion as the most important marker of 
identity, in contrast to 33.4% for language, 23.4% for citizenship or 19.3% for 
being born in Georgia. This link or, in the discourse theory terms, the chain of 
equivalence can be widely observed in the contemporary populist discourse. 
One of the recent studies conducted by the Human Rights Education and 
Monitoring Centre (Ghvinianidze and Barqaia, 2014) illustrated that among 
school teachers there is a widely-held belief that being Georgian and being 
Orthodox Christian are identical, equal concepts. One of the teachers who 
participated in the study claimed that while a Georgian was fighting for his/her 
own country, he or she was protecting Christianity. According to another, it is 
unacceptable for a Georgian to be a Jehovah Witness. This belief is so deeply 
embedded in discourses that, for instance, in July of 2017, at the opening 
ceremony of a hotel in the village where the current patriarch of the GOC was 
born, the prime minister was quoted to have called the GOC and the Georgian 
state “interwoven” and “secularism in its classical sense” misplaced in Georgia. 
In addition, he claimed that the relationship between the Church and the state 
currently present in Georgia is a “unique model” (Civil Georgia, 2017).  
In addition to the origin of the formula, Georgian equals an Orthodox Christian, 
the origin of the phenomenon of Christian Stalin must be explored as well. What 
is important to note here is that the roots of the image are not solely Georgian, 
but go deep into the Russian religious discourse as well. But it acquires a 
different level in the former case, as it is interlinked with the national identity 
discourse. Briefly discussing the origin of the myth of the Soviet leader believing 
in God might shed some light as to why such an idea managed to gain roots in 
some of the Orthodox Christian Churches. This image started to take its shape 
during the Second World War. To be more precise, as Hitler’s army was 
marching deeper into the territory of the Soviet Union, the communist 
propaganda machine started reproducing a more nationalist discourse in order 
to increase patriotic sentiments and support among the population. References 
to patriotic feelings were actively employed. World War II became the Great 
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Patriotic War in Soviet Russia to associate it with the tsarist-era Patriotic War 
against Napoleon. Movies and novels started to appear based on the lives of 
the historical heroes, battles and events. In the year 1943, Politburo decided to 
edit the national anthem of the USSR and replace the word “international” with 
Russia. The new anthem verses were:  
 
“An indestructible union of free republics 
was bound together by Great Russ!” 
 
Invoking nationalist sentiments required references to be made to Orthodox 
Christianity, as well as the abandonment of the war on religion. Stalin went as 
far as restoring the Russian patriarch which had been abolished since the tsarist 
era. Churches were allowed to start functioning again, and priests were 
encouraged to perform prayers for the USSR. The Metropolitan of Moscow of 
that time is quoted to have called Stalin “our common father” (Sixsmith, 2011: 
345).  
There are two interesting legends which were born only in the beginning of the 
1990s, but which actively contribute to the reproduction of the myth. One of them 
also became an inspiration for a controversial icon placed in the church of Saint 
Nikolas in Moscow. It was condemned by the officials from the Moscow 
Patriarchate and was quickly removed, but the story depicted on the icon is still 
reproduced as true fact in some of the discourses (Achmatova, 2010). The icon 
depicted Stalin meeting Matrona of Moscow, a saint living in his era. According 
to the legend, while Germans were advancing towards Moscow, Stalin payed a 
visit to Matrona. The blind saint predicted the victory over Nazism, as long as 
Stalin would remain in Moscow. The Soviet leader indeed stayed in the capital 
and the USSR won the war, but there is no historical evidence of such a meeting 
ever taking place. 
Second, a similar story argues that in 1941, while Metropolitan Ilya of the 
Antioch was praying to God, the Virgin Mary appeared to him and instructed 
him to tell to Russians that they should carry the Icon of the Mother of God of 
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Kazan in Stalingrad, as well as in Moscow and Leningrad. In the battle of 
Stalingrad, the icon was present and the victory was attributed to it. The legend 
has it that the Virgin Mary was also present on the side of Soviets in the attack 
on Konigsberg in 1944 and that German soldiers saw the image of her in the 
sky while their weapons would not fire (Orhtodoxy.ge, n.d.). This legend is so 
strongly embedded in the clerical discourse of the Georgian Orthodox Church 
that references to it come up even in 2017. The most recent example being in 
November of the same year, as a minor incident took place in Georgia. Namely, 
one of the high clergymen came under fire from some members of society as 
he was accused of using a border police helicopter to fly over some towns in 
Eastern Georgia and blessing the region. In his defence, metropolitan Sergi 
responded: “Our eparchy and borders of Georgia are blessed and flown over 
by icons sometimes … During the war, in the same manner, icons were taken 
around Moscow and the enemy could not enter” (Tabula, 2017).  
In 2015, one of Georgian priests, father Ioane Chigogidze, filmed a 
documentary about Stalin, titled “Who Won the War” (Tskhoidze, 2015). In the 
movie, it is argued that the breakout of the war between Germany and the USSR 
was a punishment from God for their struggle against the Christian faith. But 
later on, father Ioane suggests that the icon of Virgin Mary was leading the 
Soviet army in the battles against the Nazi Germany (ibid). Coming back to 
interdiscursivity and intertextuality, which are the vital concepts of discourse 
analysis, this movie serves as an example of those, as it refers to the legend 
already mentioned above about Metropolitan Ilya and his vision. It goes even 
further, by claiming that after the news of the vision reached Stalin, he asked 
Metropolitan Sergi if the Church was in need of anything else, to which he got 
the response that there was a lack of qualified clergymen.  
Sputnik-Georgia quotes father Ioane from the movie, where he argues that 
“after the war, Stalin, as promised, built 22,000 churches and monasteries. 
Clerical seminaries and academies were opened in the country. An age of the 
raising of faith began in the Soviet Union because all the prophecies came true 
and Stalin kept his promises” (ibid).  
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The key strength of discourse theory in explaining this paradox lies in the 
understanding of identity as something that is never fully fixed, but in a constant 
flux. It is always constituted and renegotiated according to the circumstances. 
Hence, despite the national identity discourse which uses Orthodox Christianity 
as its nodal point clearly being the product of the post-USSR epoch, it redefines 
and reproduces the image of Stalin by investing meaning through the expansion 
of the chain of signification. It excludes all the other meanings this sign could 
have and tries to fix it within the discourse. Looking from this perspective, the 
fact that about 41% of Georgian respondents thought that Stalin believed in 
God, in contrast to 22.6% who said the opposite (Gugishvili et al, 2015), does 
not seem so paradoxical anymore. Especially if one takes into consideration 
that the 77% of them mentioned Georgian as his nationality (ibid). These figures 
show that there is a strong connection between Stalin’s ethnic background and 
his alleged religious faith. The empirical part of this research revealed how such 
image is produced and maintained by populist discourse on national identity.  
 
Conclusion 
This paper addressed the paradox which can be observed in contemporary 
Georgia. Despite historical evidence of damage and suffering religious 
institutions experienced under Stalin’s rule (Gelava, 2016), and the fact that he 
was largely responsible for the invasion and occupation of the Republic of 
Georgia by Soviet Russia in 1918 (Khundadze, 2017), he remains a popular 
figure for what this paper labelled as the populist discourse on national identity. 
As it was illustrated above, he is often represented as a deeply religious man, 
who took care of the Church and clerical education, restored the Russian 
patriarchate etc.  
Looking at these developments from a discourse theory perspective, the idea 
of Christian Stalin seems less paradoxical. Theoretical and methodological tools 
offered by this school of thought help to shed some light on how such discourse 
came into existence. To be more precise, one of the key characteristics of the 
populist discourse is its reproduction of the exclusive idea of national identity. In 
other words, the main identity markers for distinguishing someone as Georgian 
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is their religious and ethnic belonging, which is represented through the formula 
Georgian = Orthodox Christian. This is what discourse theory considers to be 
the chain of significations, which organizes around the nodal point of Orthodox 
Christianity. Stalin, who in this context is a sign floating in the field of discursivity 
(i.e. any possible meaning it could have) by this chain of equivalence acquires 
the identity of being a Christian since he is also Georgian, and it cannot be 
otherwise. Methodological tools, such as intertextuality and interdiscursivity, 
further helped the research to illustrate how these images are interlinked and 
reproduced in various texts.  
Lastly, it is important to note, such an image of Stalin is purely the product of 
the post-Soviet era. The identity/meaning of Stalin varies from discourse to 
discourse and changes according to the circumstances, as history can be 
perceived only through contemporary gaze. The Soviet leader is Georgian and 
a believer according to the populist identity discourse, while at the same time, 
he is invested with the meaning of bloody tyrant, dictator etc. by other 
discourses. But alternative chains of significations were not covered within the 
framework of this particular paper.  
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